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Profile: GMOs and Regulatory Styles 
While the release into the environment and marketing of genetically modified 
organisms - GMOs - and their derivative products, represent issues with global 
relevance and implications, no singular approach has developed to regulate them in the 
two decades since gene-splicing technology became commercially viable. 
 
The aim of this profile is modest: its main objective is to sketch the histories of the 
regulatory “paradigms of assessment and control” (Jasanoff, 1995: 313) concerning 
rDNA research in the US and EU, outlining the two divergent strategies which 
ultimately emerged from their experiences. A key factor contributing to the eventual 
development of two distinct approaches toward the derivative products of genetic 
modification concerns the level of organisation found in the scientific and industry 
constituencies in the two blocs. The piece ends noting the importance of placing the 
regulation of this specific issue within a template of global politics - a point illustrated 
with some contemporary examples from Japan and New Zealand. 
 
The US: Evolution of a ‘Product-Oriented’ Style 
The first loosely regulatory initiative relating to research in genetic modification stems 
from the self-imposed guidelines drafted by those scientists in the US at the forefront of 
genetic manipulation experimentation in the 1970s. This code was drawn up at the 
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International Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules at Asilomar, California in 
19752 and formed the basis of the laboratory research guidelines adopted by the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). It was Asilomar which alerted some key 
constituencies to the potential importance of rDNA technology, although it was 
certainly the scientists who, necessarily, held the detailed knowledge and thus it could 
be argued, the whip hand. Indeed, the emphasis placed by the scientific community 
upon the lack of negative consequences of genetic engineering is widely acknowledged 
as the argument which dissuaded Congress from the need for legislative initiatives to 
replace the guidelines (Cantley, 1995). Such was the confidence in the science that an 
initial ban which the scientists set, covering certain deliberate release experiments, was 
revoked after only two years (Jasanoff, 1995: 328). 
 
The Asilomar-NIH concordat was initially intended as a voluntary - and temporary - 
agreement within the scientific community. Nevertheless, the code’s endorsement by 
the federal NIH ensured that the scientists’ code was to set the tone for the future 
federal and binding approach to GMO regulation, as genetic modification moved out of 
the laboratory and into the real world. 
 
The pace at which scientific exploration on rDNA developed in the US meant that the 
first applications for deliberate release experiments had no tailor-made institution to be 
submitted to (Jasanoff, 1995: 314). As Jasanoff reports, this gap ensured that the NIH’s 
Recombinant Advisory Committee (NIH RAC) was logically viewed as the formal 
body to scrutinise such requests. In addition, this committee oversaw federally funded 
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rDNA experimentation, the result being a situation where “governmental control... was 
tied to the sponsorship of research” (1995: 314). 
 
This approach both to manage experimentation and foster commercialisation - which 
evolved in the late 1970s under the NIH RAC’s research conduct guidelines - can be 
viewed as having set the tone for the regulatory approach concerning the derivative 
products of genetic modification. This approach has been popularly encapsulated by the 
shorthand term: a ‘product-oriented’ system (Gibb et al 1987 cited in Kim, 1992: 1161 
& Jasanoff, 1995). This describes US administrations’ consistent focus upon the 
intended use of the end product rather than the recombinant technology deployed to 
create it in the first place. Thus, in the US, the authority of existing laws and agencies 
are deemed sufficient to cope with any novelties of genetic modification. 
 
The NIH’s dual regulatory role was ended in 1986 by a court ruling against one of its 
decisions. This forced the US government to divide assessment between the NIH and 
three other agencies - the USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) - which were co-ordinated by the “Biotechnology 
Science Co-ordinating Committee” (BSCC). However, this farming out of NIH 
competences did not shake the core assumption - that all organisms carry equivalent 
safety considerations - which had underpinned the federal approach post-Asilomar. This 
understanding of the technology had been largely secured by the pivotal role of 
scientists in the US’s early regulatory experience (Jasanoff, 1995). This further 
highlights the central importance of the “well-grouped” scientific constituency which 
had formed around genetic engineering (Cantley, 1995), with professional bodies like 
the American Society of Microbiologists (ASM) at this lobby’s core. 
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The consistency of the US’s focus on product has been matched by the undeviating pro-
product pressure from both the scientific lobby and that of the biotech industry. Industry 
organisations (the Industrial Biotechnology Association - IBA and the Association of 
Biotechnology Companies - ABC) were set up in the early 1980s to represent the 
fledging industry, primarily against various judicial attacks (Cantley, 1995: 535). This 
robust organisational defence in favour of the prevailing policy undoubtedly made it 
easier to keep any political and public challenges in check. 
 
Europe/EU: The Evolution of a ‘Process-Oriented’ Style 
The alternative regulatory approach to GM products is characterised by concern with 
the actual GM technology itself, and is known as the ‘process-oriented’ approach. 
Under process-informed regulatory regimes, emphasis rests firmly upon formal 
authorisation along with case-by-case health and environmental risk assessments, both 
before and after a GM product’s release into either environment or market. The  
(pre-) caution which underpins this approach is reflected in the contingent nature of the 
legislation it yields – with many of the ‘process’ regulations being characterised by 
reviews and revision, in response to scientific developments, popular opinion and the 
commercial world. 
 
One of the first European countries to make operational such a process schema was 
Denmark, with its 1986 Environmental and Gene Technology Act. This prohibited the 
deliberate release of GMOs unless special approval had been proffered by the Minister 
of Environment. However, although the law appeared fairly restrictive, by 1989 
Denmark had authorised selected field trials of herbicide-resistant sugar beet. Of course, 
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since 1990, Denmark and the 14 other countries of the European Union have had their 
regulatory strategies directed from the supranational level by two directives, 
underscored by a process logic: 90/219/EEC (contained use) and 90/220/EEC 
(deliberate release).  
 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the path toward this process legislation 
was linear. Individual European countries and also the EU (in its various forms) adopted 
regulatory tones very similar to the US throughout the 1980s concerning both end 
products as well as rDNA research. In particular, the UK’s approach to research 
mirrored the flexible notification guidelines established under Asilomar, with the 
Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG) paralleling the work of the NIH RAC. 
Indeed, the UK led the scientific community in the early phase of regulation (as it did in 
research), being the first to introduce a moratorium on rDNA experiments in 1974 after 
the publication of the ‘Berg letter’. 
 
At EU level, lessons on research regulation were drawn directly from the US. This was 
exemplified in 1980 when the Commission withdrew an authorisation proposal for 
rDNA research, replacing it by a proposal for more flexible, non-binding notification. 
The result was Council Recommendation 82/472 which deemed existing sectoral level 
legislation as sufficient to oversee the technology’s development. It should be noted that 
the Commission’s endorsement of technique-based oversight of research occurred after 
a meeting between the Commission officials and the Director of the US’s NIH. 
 
However, Europe ultimately diverged from the course set by the US. Political pressure, 
principally from the European Parliament’s Viehoff Report (1987) on biotechnology, 
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signalled a challenge to the notion that notification of research alone was adequate. The 
report’s argument drew upon concerns that some experimental releases had already 
taken place without any binding legislation in place regarding safety (Cantley, 1995; 
542), and cited genetic engineering as carrying with it “special risks”. With this 
statement, Viehoff rejected the international consensus which had formed around the 
OECD’s 1986 report. Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations (known as the ‘blue 
book’) had defended the technique style of regulation, and interestingly was part-
authored by European Commission officials from DGXII. 
 
The European change of approach is exemplified by Directive 90/220, covering the 
procedures for the approval of new GM products and releases. This legislation has 
proved to be particularly controversial. Under this directive, ‘national competent 
authorities’ assess the applications for GMO authorisation on a case-by-case basis. In 
contrast to the US, these assessment bodies are often composed of interested parties, 
such as environmentalists, as well as scientists. This ‘insider’ status of selected lay 
actors brings into relief a key difference between the process- and product-oriented 
systems, with critics of the former arguing it entails more than a straightforward appeal 
to ‘objective knowledge’, i.e. science. In addition, the European case has a 
supranational dimension, whereby licences for commercial releases may only be 
granted with the approval of the member states by majority vote, where an objection is 
raised by another country.  
 
As a directive, ‘220’ merely lays down the minimum standards which member states 
must ensure are met in their own laws. So while the supranational level ensures EU 
states are covered by a ‘process’ umbrella, it is these individual countries which control 
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the manner in which it is implemented. Thus states can give some degree of expression 
to their own conceptualisation of risk, leading to various strains of the process style 
housed under the one roof3. 
 
The very existence of directive 90/220 undoubtedly reflects the absence, for most of the 
1980s, of any powerful biotech lobby organisation in Europe. The first operation - the 
Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB) - was not set up until 1989 - too late 
to have any meaningful impact upon the pending legislative proposals. As a result, 
throughout the 1990s, the European lobby - latterly in the shape of EuropaBio - was in a 
position of attacking what the industry dubbed ‘catch 220’ (Cantley, 16/12/98: 20) and 
its protracted approval procedures4. Their criticisms have been widely acknowledged in 
the EU, and the 90/220 replacement directives and regulations currently being discussed 
broadly aim to provide clearer procedures for biotech firms marketing GM products. 
The European lobby focused upon the argument that the potential for wealth creation 
was being stifled by the process legislation, and putting the EU at a competitive 
disadvantage. However the legislation being developed is set to retain the theme of 
authorisation, fitting with the public mood in Europe. Thus some dilution - but no 
reversal - of the process approach of product regulation is likely. 
 
Beyond the US/EU dualism 
The US and EU are, of course, part of a wider global narrative. Indeed, one of the 
notable features of the GMO issue concerns the degree of influence which the actions of 
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one country or bloc can have upon another. As noted, the US has been influential, and 
for many nations been the country to watch (particularly in the regulation of rDNA 
research). Recent developments in New Zealand’s approach to GMOs flag up the 
centrality which exogenous forces can have in determining the type of legislative 
regime favoured by a country in a given context. Reporting in The Ecologist 
(August/September 1999), Jeanette Fitzsimons, Member of Parliament and co-leader of 
the NZ Green Party, describes the government’s vacillation between process- and 
product-oriented approaches when deciding its stance on GM product labelling. The 
apparent move away from a commitment on mandatory labelling should be viewed as 
underscored by desire for an NZ-US free trade agreement (Fitzsimons quotes leaked 
cabinet minutes and communications from the US to this effect). 
 
However it is not only formal legislative developments which can have a knock-on 
effect at the national level. Developments in popular opinion and environmental spheres 
should also be viewed as capable of effecting change. An example of environmental 
developments could be seen in September 1999 when Japan announced plans for a five-
year project to investigate the possible long-term environmental implications which GM 
releases may entail. In particular, this related to concerns about possible negative 
consequences of gene transfer between crops (Saegusa, 2/9/99: 3), with the Monarch 
butterfly controversy in the US as the instigator5. 
 
Round-up 
The EU played ‘follow the leader’ with the US (and UK initially) in the first regulatory 
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flurry surrounding rDNA research, with consensus built around the adoption of flexible, 
voluntary guidelines. However this harmonised approach was ended in the mid-1980s 
as political pressure in Europe mounted over how to regulate both research and the 
technology’s eventual end-products. The European Parliament’s Viehoff Report 
coupled with the lack of an organised industrial and scientific lobby -like those of the 
US - effected a total change of direction, away from the technique and product based 
approaches. The result has been two management systems co-existing in GMO 
regulation, vying for the support and conversion of other countries. 
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Abbreviations 
ABC  Association of Biotechnology Companies 
ASM  American Society of Microbiologists 
BSCC  Biotechnology Science Co-ordinating Committee 
DNA  Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency 
EU  European Union 
FDA  Food and Drug Administration 
GM  Genetically Modified 
GMAG Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group 
GMO  Genetically Modified Organism 
IBA  Industrial Biotechnology Association 
NIH  National Institutes of Health 
NIH RAC National Institutes of Health Recombinant Advisory Committee 
NZ  New Zealand 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
rDNA  Recombinant DNA 
SAGB  Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology 
US  United States 
USDA  United States Agriculture Department 
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Footnotes 
1 The author would like to thank Mark Cantley and David Judge for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 It should be noted that the 1975 Asilomar was preceded by a similar conference at the 
same location in 1973. It was this earlier conference which placed genetic engineering 
firmly on the US scientific agenda. For further reading Mark Cantley provides an 
accessible account of these two key meetings at Asilomar in the 1970s, as well as a 
detailed regulatory history. 
3 It should be pointed out that the ability of member states to introduce specific national 
provisions must be based on new scientific evidence and is restricted by the terms laid 
out in Article 95 (ex 100a). 
4 This refers to the idea that 90/220’s initial goal to attenuate consumer and 
environmental anxieties about this new technology may have had the unintended 
consequence of frustrating the development of safer products. 
5 This refers to Cornell University research published in Nature which reported that 
Monarch butterflies had been poisoned by modified corn (Bt-corn). 
 
